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Existing studies on women directorships present equivocal results on the association between appointing
women directors and ﬁrm performance. These studies tend to focus on western countries and largely ignore
investors' reactions to such appointments. This paper applies the ﬁnancial event study method and ﬁnds that
investors generally respondpositively to the appointment ofwomendirectors in Singaporeanﬁrms. Regression
analyses also reveal that investors aremost receptivewhen thewomen are independent directors and are least
receptivewhen the directors assume the CEO role. This study not only tests the theory of gender diversity in an
Asian context but also examines whether investors react systematically to the different positions that women
directors hold on corporate boards, a question that has received little attention in prior studies.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The appointment of women directors captures the attention of
researchers, investor groups, and policy makers. Existing studies gather
statistics on women directors, examine the predictors of women
directors, and analyze the results of appointing women directors in
various national settings (Burke, 1999; Daily et al., 1999; Hillman et al.,
2007; Rose, 2007; Ruigrok et al., 2007; Singh et al., 2001;Westphal and
Milton, 2000). TIAA-CREF, a U.S. institutional investor, endorses the
appointment of qualiﬁed individuals who reﬂect diversity of gender,
among other attributes, to corporate boards (TIAA-CREF, 1997). The
Norwegian Company Act codiﬁes the proportion of women directors on
corporate boards (Huse and Solberg, 2006; Rose, 2007). The escalating
interest in women directorship coincides with a period of increasing
representation of women on corporate boards (Daily et al., 1999; Farrell
andHersch, 2005). For instance, a recent study ﬁnds that the percentage
of board seats held bywomendirectors in Fortune 1000ﬁrmsmore than
doubled from 5.6% in 1990 to 12.3% in 1999 (Farrell and Hersch, 2005).
This paper examines investors' reactions to the appointment of
women directors by ﬁrms listed on the Singapore Exchange (SGX). In
addition, this study examines a research question that has received little
attention in the existing literature: Do investors react systematically to
the different positions that women directors occupy on corporate
boards? This study not only contributes to the existing research on
corporate boards in SGX-listedﬁrms (Mak and Li, 2001;Ong et al., 2003;
Wan and Ong, 2005) by examining how receptive investors are of
women directors, but this study also sheds light on the generalization of
results from prior studies of women directors internationally (Carter
et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Rose, 2007;
Shrader et al., 1997; Singh et al., 2001). This study is timely since the
topic of women directorships in Singapore is starting to attract interest
in the local business community. For instance, a search of The Business
Times, the primary source of local business news in Singapore, reveals
only two published news articles pertaining to women directorships in
the1990s comparedwith17newsarticles between2000and2007.Most
of the news articles highlight the under-representation of women
directors in Singapore's corporate boardrooms.
A review of the literature suggests that increasing gender diversity in
corporate boards by appointing women directors can improve the ability
of boards to discharge their control and strategic roles. Similarly, the
positive beneﬁts of gender diversity in corporate boards are the primary
reasons cited for the appointment of morewomen directors in Singapore
(The Business Times, 2006). This study employs the ﬁnancial event study
method commonly used in ﬁnance and accounting literature and ﬁnds a
signiﬁcant increase in the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of
1.22% on and one day after announcing the appointment of women
directors. The results suggest that investors are generally receptive to the
appointment of women directors on the boards of SGX-listed ﬁrms and
adjust upwards the expected future value of the ﬁrm. Furthermore,
regression analyses on the CAAR suggest that investors react least
positively when the appointed director also assumes the CEO position of
the ﬁrm, while investors are most positive in their reaction when the
appointed directors are independent. These results provide support for
Kanter's (1977) token status theory and suggest that investors are
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especially receptive to the appointment of women directors when the
directors maintain or increase the independence of the corporate board.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
The appointment of women directors is assessable from the
viewpoint of value creation through an economic perspective. Not
surprisingly, theNational Association of CorporateDirectors BlueRibbon
Commission, a U.S. non-proﬁtmembership organization endeavoring to
improve corporate performance through better board practice, recom-
mends that board of directors consider gender diversity in the selection
of their members (National Association of Corporate Directors, 1994).
Several empirical studies analyze the assertion that gender diversity in
corporate boards could lead to improvedﬁrmperformance. For instance,
Catalyst (2004) ﬁnds that Fortune 500 ﬁrms with a high representation
ofwomen top executives have signiﬁcantly higher returns on equity and
total returns to shareholders when compared with Fortune 500 ﬁrms
with low representation. A comparable study of publicly-listed ﬁrms in
the U.K. shows similar results: women directors are more likely to be in
bigger, more proﬁtable ﬁrms, particularly those with the largest sales
turnover (Singh et al., 2001). Similarly, Carter et al. (2003)ﬁndapositive
and signiﬁcant association between ﬁrms with women directors and
Tobin's Q in a sample of Fortune 1000 ﬁrms. Finally, Erhardt et al. (2003)
ﬁnd evidence of a positive and signiﬁcant relation between the
proportion of women and minorities on corporate boards and the
return on assets as well as the return on investment in large U.S. ﬁrms.
Gender diversity in corporate boards is likely to impact ﬁrm
performance through its inﬂuence on the roles of corporate boards.
Scholars generally agree that boards have two active roles: control and
strategic (Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). The control
role requires corporate boards, as ﬁduciaries of stockholders, to
monitor top executives and to ensure that the owners can preserve
their interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Reference to a board's
strategic role generally points to a broad assortment of activities that
range from providing advice and counsel to active participation in
strategic decisions that include the initiation and formulation of
corporate strategies (O'Neal and Thomas, 1996; Westphal, 1999).
Outside directors, that is, non-executive directors, are important in
discharging the control role of corporate boards by monitoring the
actions of top executives and reducing agency costs (Walsh and Seward,
1990). Increasing gender diversity in male-dominated corporate boards
can enhance the control role of boards because women directors are
largely outside directors (Daily et al., 1999). Kesner (1988) ﬁnds that
women directors have an equal or better chance of serving on important
corporate governance committees, such as the audit, compensation, and
nominating committees, when compared with male directors. Further-
more, Selby (2000) notes that boards are more likely to develop a
questioning culture when women directors are present, which reduces
the likelihood of rubber-stamping management decisions. Hence,
increasing gender diversity in corporate boards can better protect the
wealth of shareholders by improving control over top executives.
The strategic role of corporate boards can also beneﬁt from gender
diversity (Fondas, 2000). The literature on group diversity suggests that
diversity has a positive association with ﬁrm performance since group
diversity not only increases the pool of knowledge from which group
decisions aremade but also facilitates innovation and creativity (Bantel,
1993; Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000; Simons and Pelled, 1999; Watson
et al., 1993). Hence, corporate boards elevate their competence proﬁle
through the appointmentofwomendirectors tomale-dominant boards,
resulting in better strategic decisions and ﬁrm performance (Judge and
Zeithaml, 1992; Westphal, 1999). Indeed, women executives can
enhance a ﬁrm's capabilities to be ﬂexible and deal with ambiguity
(Rosener, 1995). Furthermore, appointing women directors can also
reduce the likelihood of excessive risk-taking in strategic decisions since
women are more likely to show risk aversion in ﬁnancial decision
making than men (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998).
Investors are likely to react positively to the potential beneﬁts of a
gender-diverse board. Furthermore, improving a board's control and its
strategic roles may not be the only beneﬁt of appointing women
directors. Rose (2007) suggests that a gender-diverse board serve as a
positive signal that welcomes work-force diversity, which attracts
qualiﬁed employees from a wider pool of applicants. Given that
investors do rely on signals from ﬁrms to make investment decisions
(Kang, 2008; Sanders and Boivie, 2004), they are likely to react
positively to the appointment of women directors to the extent that
work-force diversity is a source of competitive advantage for ﬁrms
(Richard, 2000).
Hypothesis 1a. Publicly-listed ﬁrms experience positive abnormal
returns when they announce the appointment of women directors.
Although the positive beneﬁts of women directorships have some
empirical support, a fewstudies fail toﬁnda signiﬁcant relationbetween
women directorships and ﬁrm performance (Rose, 2007; Shrader et al.,
1997). For instance, Shrader et al. (1997) consistently ﬁnd negative but
insigniﬁcant associations between the proportion of women directors
and several accounting measures of performance for large U.S. ﬁrms.
Similarly, Rose (2007)ﬁnds no signiﬁcant association betweenTobin's Q
and ﬁrms with women directors in Danish ﬁrms. Likewise, Farrell and
Hersch (2005) ﬁnd no wealth effect when they examine investors'
reaction to the appointment of women directors in large U.S. ﬁrms
during the 1990s. These equivocal resultsmay be due tomethodological
differences, such as how gender diversity and ﬁrm performance are
measured, or to differences in national cultural attitudes towardwomen
that affect the generalization of results across countries. For instance,
surveys from the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior
Effectiveness Research Program (GLOBE) ﬁnd that societies in different
countries have dissimilar attitudes toward the division of roles between
sexes, such as having women in positions of authority or according
women a higher status in society (House et al., 2004).
Another plausible reasonwhy some studies do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
relation betweenwomen directorships and ﬁrmperformance is that the
beneﬁts of increased gender diversity may not materialize as expected
(Huse, 2007). For instance, Huse and Solberg (2006) ﬁnd that the
contribution of women directors in Scandinavia depends on thewomen
directors' abilityandwillingness tomake allianceswith inﬂuential board
members and take leadership roles, among other factors. However, the
small number ofwomendirectors on a board canmarginalize their roles
and responsibilities. Rosener (1995) notes that boards with only one or
two women directors bear the risk of not being taken seriously, while
those with three or more women directors are more likely to reap the
beneﬁts. Furthermore, Knight et al. (1999) ﬁnd that gender-diverse
boards can spend a greater amount of time and effort to reach a
consensus or experience increased conﬂict. Tsui et al. (1992) show that
increasing gender diversity inwork groups dominated bymen can result
in more frequent absences, lower psychological commitment, and less
intent to stay with the ﬁrm. In addition, mixed-sex groups in a study by
Wood (1987) do not appear to perform signiﬁcantly better than single-
sex groups. These arguments suggest that the beneﬁts of appointing
women directors may not materialize, and investors may not react
positively to such appointments.
Hypothesis 1b. Publicly-listed ﬁrms experience non-positive abnor-
mal returns following announcements of the appointment of women
directors.
Prior studies ignore the positions that women directors hold on the
board. The oversight may explain the inconclusive results in existing
studies. Corporate boards are comprised of inside and outside directors.
Inside directors are executives of the ﬁrm and typically include the CEO,
while outside directors are non-executives of the ﬁrm who may be
independent or have business interests beyond those of a director (i.e.,
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afﬁliate directors). Several reasons may explain why investors react
differently towomen directors appointed to different positions. A recent
study by Lee and James (2007) of top executive (as opposed to director)
appointments in theU.S. from1990 to 2000 ﬁnds that investor reactions
to announcements of women CEOs are signiﬁcantly negative compared
with the positive effects when women are appointed to non-CEO
positions. They argue that while women can experience gender role
stereotyping in top executive positions, women CEOs are more likely to
be adversely affected by perceptual biases and detrimental stereotypes
compared to other top executive appointments because women CEOs
are less common (Kanter, 1977).
Kanter's (1977) token status theory, as cited in Lee and James
(2007), can also be applicable to corporate boards. At its core, the token
status theory suggests that individuals who hold positions that deviate
fromsocietal expectations are likely to drawnegative attention leading
to negative consequences (such as detrimental stereotyping) for
themselves and the organization. Women in the labor force largely ﬁll
female-typed occupations and select female-typed specialties because
the occupations and specialties, such as nursing and health adminis-
tration, respectively, tend to be congruent with female stereotypes
(Blau and Ferber, 1985; Broverman et al., 1972; Frieze et al., 1978).
Typically, female-oriented occupations and specialties tend to have
lower social power and prestige and exert less inﬂuence in organiza-
tions than those of man-oriented occupations (Ragins and Sundstrom,
1989). Thus, the low representation ofwomen inpositions of corporate
power, such as CEO positions, reinforces social stereotypes. However,
when a woman director is also appointed CEO, the deviation from
female stereotypes leads to negative attention since women CEOs are
present in fewer numbers. These arguments suggest that announce-
ments of women occupying other executive (or inside) board
appointments are more positive (or less negative) than announce-
ments of women CEOs. The appointment of women as outside
directors can elicitmore positive (or less negative) reactions compared
with those of women CEOs, given that CEOs tend to play amore pivotal
role (relative to outside directors) in inﬂuencing board composition
and involvement (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989).
Hypothesis 2a. Stock market reaction to announcements of women
directors occupying non-CEO executive board positions is more
positive than the reaction to announcements of women CEOs.
Hypothesis 2b. Stock market reaction to announcements of women
directors occupying outside board positions is more positive than the
reaction to announcements of women CEOs.
3. Research method
3.1. Sample
Singapore offers an interesting location to test this study's hypotheses.
The topic ofwomendirectorships has received increasingmedia attention
in Singapore since the beginning of 2000. A 2004 survey by The Business
Times (Singapore) ﬁnds that only 8% of board seats at Singapore-listed
ﬁrms is female. The small number ofwomen directorsmay stem from the
traditional view of women as primarily responsible for family care and
welfare in Singapore, where women are often the default caregiver or
homemaker (The Business Times, 2006). However, Teh (2003) notes that
gender diversity on Singapore corporate boards may have a positive
associationwith ﬁrm performance. Increasing media coverage of women
directorships is likely to mirror increasing public interest in the
appointment of women directors, and hence, an interest in the results of
this study.
SGX-listed ﬁrms satisfy three broad criteria for analysis. First, their
common stocks trade actively and are thus suitable for performing
reliable statistical estimations. Second, corporate governance informa-
tion is available from electronic/printed annual reports of these ﬁrms.
Third, announcement dates of director appointments are accessible.
Firms fax the letters of appointment to the SGX or deliver them
electronically for each female director appointment. The SGXmakes the
news publicly available by transmitting the information to their brokers
and posting the announcements on the SGX website.
The following criteria guide the choice of sample ﬁrms. First, the
SGX-listed ﬁrms must have at least one woman director in 2004,
which is the latest year where annual reports are fully available for
all ﬁrms when the study began. The year also falls within the period
of increasing media attention to and interest in women director-
ships. Of the 601 SGX-listed ﬁrms, 261 (i.e., 43%) satisfy this
criterion. Next, the appointment date of the female director who is
present in 2004 must be after the ﬁrm becomes a public company so
the stock price data are available for the analysis. Of the remaining
ﬁrms, 27%meet this criterion, bringing the sample to 70 ﬁrms. Third,
the ﬁrm must have at least 200 trading days prior to the
announcement date to facilitate the estimation of the parameters
in the ﬁnancial event study. Of the remaining ﬁrms, 84% meet this
criterion, taking the sample to 59 ﬁrms. Finally, 14 ﬁrms with
confounding announcements close to or on the announcement date
of the female directorship appointment are not in the analysis,
leaving 45 ﬁrms or 17% of the 261 SGX-listed ﬁrms with women
directors in 2004. With the removal of these ﬁrms, only relevant
stock price movements are likely due to the appointment of women
directors, hence ruling out alternative explanations for the results
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Seven of the 45 ﬁrms have multiple
announcements of female director appointments. Speciﬁcally, six
ﬁrms have two separate announcements while one ﬁrm has three
separate announcements. This study assumes that the multiple
announcements made by the same ﬁrm are independent if they
occur at least ten trading days after the prior announcement. The 45
ﬁrms in the ﬁnal sample are from nine industries with a total of 53
announcements made during the period of 1994 to 2004. A
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test (Siegel and Castellan, 1988)
reveals no signiﬁcant differences in the distribution of ﬁrm size and
proﬁtability between the 45 ﬁrms and other ﬁrms with at least one
woman director (pN0.05). The total assets of the 45 ﬁrms range from
S$5.8 million to S$113 billionwith a mean and standard deviation of
S$5.2 and S$21.1 billion, respectively. The board size ranges from ﬁve
to 16 members with a mean of 8.7. The nine industries are
commercial, hotels/restaurants, manufacturing, multi-industry,
property, construction, services, ﬁnance, and transport/commu-
nication, with at least two announcements from each industry
sector.
3.2. Method
The study uses a standard ﬁnancial event study method to test
Hypothesis 1. The abnormal return from an announcement is the actual
ex post return on the share price of a ﬁrmminus the normal return over
an event window, ARjt=Rjt−E(Rjt), where ARjt is the abnormal return
on the share price for ﬁrm j on event day t, Rjt is the actual ex post return,
and E(Rjt) is the normal return. The normal return is the same as the
expected return if the event (i.e., appointment of female director) does
not take place and is computed using a market model of the normal
share price behavior. Themarketmodel is a statisticalmodel that relates
the return of any given ﬁrm's stock to the return of a speciﬁed market
portfolio, E(Rjt)=αj+βiRmt+εjt, where Rmt is the return of the market
on day t using the return on the Singapore All-Sing Equities Index,αj is a
stable component of the share returns for ﬁrm j and is constant over
time, βj is the beta or a measurement of the systematic risk of ﬁrm j and
is stable over time, and εjt is the random error term. The market model
requires an estimationwindow,which is set for the period starting from
200 to 11 trading days prior to the announcement date (t=0). The
abnormal stock return is computed after determining the normal return
from the market model. The average abnormal returns for the entire
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sample should ﬂuctuate randomly about zero if announcements of
female director appointments have no impact on stock prices. Eq. (1)








where AR is as earlier deﬁned and N refers to the number of
announcements, which is 53 in this study. The daily stock returns and
Singapore-All Sing Equities Index information, adjusted for dividends
and other capital changes, are from Bloomberg.
Regression analyses produce the statistics to test Hypotheses 2a
and b. The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) over the two-
day event window (day 0 and day 1) is the dependent variable. A two-
dayeventwindow is usedbecausemost announcements aremadeat the
end of the trading day. Hence, using a CAAR over day 0 and day 1 will
capture any leakage of information on the day of announcement, aswell
as investors' reactions to the new information (i.e., appointment of a
woman director) on the next trading day. A female director can be
appointed as a CEO, a non-CEO executive director, or an outside director
of a ﬁrm. Two dummy variables, non-CEO executive director position
and outside director position, are created to test Hypotheses 2a and b,
respectively, using the CEO-director position as the reference group. A
non-CEO executive director position is equal to one if the appointed
female director is an executive director but not the CEO of the ﬁrm, and
zero otherwise. An outside director position is equal to one if the
appointed female director is anoutside director, and zero otherwise. The
regression analysis also includes several control variables. First, the
proportion of women directors on the board is included since investors'
reactions can dependonwhetherwomendirectors are currently serving
on the board. Second, the appointed year of the female director is a
control variable since investors are more receptive toward women
directors in the later period of the study. Third, the proportion of
independent directors on the board and the independence of the board
chair control for board independence. The independence of the board
chair is measured by a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO is
not the board chair, and zero otherwise. Fourth, various ﬁrm level
variables are included as controls, speciﬁcally, the number of years that
the ﬁrm has been a public company, total assets for ﬁrm size, and the
natural logarithm of net income for ﬁrm proﬁtability. Finally, the
industry that a ﬁrm belongs to is also controlled through the use of eight
dummy variables (Harrigan, 1981). The annual reports and SGX
announcements of theﬁrms provide necessary information to construct
all control variables, except the industry dummy variables. The standard
set of industrial codes in the SGX database enables the creation of the
industry dummy variables.
4. Results
4.1. The ﬁnancial event study
Table 1 shows the results of theﬁnancial event study. Forty-ﬁveﬁrms
(with 53 announcements) experience a signiﬁcant increase in average
abnormal returns of 0.21% (pb0.1) on the date of announcement. More
importantly, the average abnormal returns increase by a more
signiﬁcant 1.01% one day after the announcement date (pb0.01). The
more signiﬁcant increase onday 1occurs becausemostﬁrmson the SGX
make announcements after the end of the trading day, in which case
investors can only react one day after the announcement date. The
average abnormal returns on other trading days are not statistically
signiﬁcant. Since the average abnormal returns on day 0 and day 1 are
signiﬁcant, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) over the
two-day event window is computed; the increase of 1.22% is also
signiﬁcant (pb0.1). Hence, the results support Hypothesis 1a and reject
Hypothesis 1b. The discussion section highlights several potential
reasons for this ﬁnding.
Fig. 1 displays a plot of the CAAR over a 16-day event period, from
day −5 to day 10 and shows the announcement effect of investors
reacting positively to the news. The CAAR over the 16-day event
period is generally on an increasing trend since day −5 till day 10,
with the highest value at 2.35% and the lowest at −1.08%. Fig. 1
suggests that investors are generally receptive to the appointment of
women directors on the corporate boards of SGX-listed ﬁrms.
4.2. Regression analyses of the CAAR
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in the
regression analyses. The correlation matrix reveals signiﬁcant associa-
tions between some predictor variables, thus highlighting the impor-
tance of checking for potential multicollinearity issues in the regression
analyses. Table 3 presents the results of the analyses. The Huber-White
robust standard errors replace the standard errors in the regression
analyses to correct for heteroskedasticity of the residuals (White,1980).
The reported t-test results use one-tailed p-values for the independent
variables and two-tailed p-values otherwise. Model 2 tests the
hypotheses. Multicollinearity does not appear to pose serious problems
in this model because the individual variance inﬂation factors (VIF) are
less than 10 (ranging from 1.4 to 5.6) while the mean VIF at 2.5 is not
considerably larger than 1 (Chatterjee et al., 2000).
Model 1 in Table 3 shows the results for the control variables
(F=2.47, pb0.05), while Model 2 is the full unrestricted model where
all variables enter the regression equation (F=5.79, pb0.001). The
results support Hypotheses 2a and b. The two independent dummy
variables contribute to a model signiﬁcance that is greater than that of
the control variables in Model 1 (F=4.99, pb0.05). The CAAR is
higher when the appointed female director assumes a non-CEO
executive position than when she assumes the CEO position in the
ﬁrm (b=3.36, pb0.05). This result is consistent with those in Lee and
James (2007). Similarly, the CAAR is higher when the appointed
female director takes on an outside director position thanwhen she is
also the CEO of the ﬁrm (b=4.21, pb0.01).
4.3. Additional analyses
First, two dummy variables capturing the independence of the
female outside director replace the outside director dummy variable in
Model 2 of Table 3. An outside director of a ﬁrmmay be independent or
an afﬁliate director who has an existing business relationship with the
ﬁrm. Investors may perceive afﬁliate directors as less likely to protect
their interests because of the director's business relationship with the
ﬁrm. Model 3 in Table 3 reports the results. The model continues to be
signiﬁcant (F=3.52, pb0.001), and the three dummy independent
variables contribute to a model signiﬁcance that is greater than that of
the control variables in Model 1 (F=3.42, pb0.05). The coefﬁcient of
the non-CEO executive position variable remains signiﬁcant (b=3.39,
Table 1
Test results of average abnormal returns (AARs).
Day AAR % Z-statistic Positive Negative
−3 0.34 −0.12 22 31
−2 −0.89 −0.39 21 32
−1 0.40 −1.40 24 29
0 0.21 1.69† 29 24
1 1.01 2.50** 29 24
2 0.79 −0.21 26 27
3 −0.19 −0.16 28 25
(0, 1) 1.22 1.62† 30 23
Table 1 shows the average abnormal returns (AARs) and the Z-statistics during a 3-day
period around the announcement of appointing women directors. The number of ﬁrms
with positive and negative abnormal returns on each day is summarized as shown
above. † and ** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively.
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pb0.05). In addition, the independent director position (b=4.62,
pb0.01) appears to have a greater impact on the CAARwhen compared
to the afﬁliate director position (b=3.03, pb0.1).
Next, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990, 1997) ﬁnd positive market
reactions to the appointment of outside directors (as opposed to inside
directors) because investors, on average, perceive the appointment of
outside directors, as monitors of top executives, to be in the interest of
shareholders. Thus, an outside director effect, not the gender effect, may
be driving the earlier reported results. If investors also react positively to
the appointment of male independent directors, then support for a
gender effect is suspect. Data are collected on male director appoint-
ments in 2004, and the ﬁnancial event study is conducted to test this
alternative explanation. A total of 117 ﬁrms appoint male directors in
industries that announce female director appointments the same year.
The sample selection criteria in the earlier event study lead to a ﬁnal
sample of 51 ﬁrms with 61 announcements of male directors (8 ﬁrms
have 2 announcements while 1 ﬁrm has 3 announcements that are at
least ten trading days apart). The same parameters in the earlier
ﬁnancial event study generate the results in Table 4. The results support
the presence of a gender effect. Although the AAR signiﬁcantly declines
by 0.35% (pb0.05) for all male directors, the decline appears to be the
result of a signiﬁcant drop in returns of 2.06% (pb0.001) in response to
the appointment of male afﬁliate directors (i.e., outside directors who
are not independent but have business interests beyond those of a
director). However, investors' reactions are positive but not signiﬁcant
when male directors assume the CEO or non-CEO executive positions
and, more importantly, the independent director position.
Finally, when Model 2 does not include the eight industry dummy
variables to increase the power of the test, the results give qualitatively
similar conclusions.
5. Discussion and conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence of investors' reactions to
the appointment of women directors in Singapore-listed public ﬁrms.
The results support the view that investors respond positively to the
appointment of women directors. Several institutional reasons may
explain this ﬁnding. First, according to the GLOBE survey, Singapore's
society is generally more accepting of women having higher status in
society and playing a greater role in community decision making. Of
the 61 countries included in the survey with gender egalitarianism
scores ranging from 2.5 to 4.08, Singapore's score is relatively high at
3.7. Most studies on countries with lower gender egalitarianism scores
ﬁnd positive effects of gender diversity on ﬁrm performance, and this
study ﬁnds the same results in the Singapore context. Next, business
leaders and the popular press in Singapore espouse the positive
beneﬁts of having a gender-diverse board (Siow, 2005; Teh, 2003; The
Business Times, 2006; Yee, 2006). Thus, to the extent that public
opinions are consistent with the views of investors, investors' positive
reactions are not unexpected. Finally, some disadvantages of gender
diversity, such as spending greater time and effort to reach a
consensus or the risk of conﬂict, are more likely to occur under
conditions of high diversity, which is not the case in Singapore since
women only occupy about 8% of board seats at listed ﬁrms. These
explanations suggest that a cross-national study to examine institu-
tional effects on the outcomes of gender diversity may be a promising
area of future research since existing studies tend to adopt a single-
country perspective.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on gender issues in
at least two ways (Bu and Roy, 2005; Krishnan and Park, 2005;
Musteen et al., 2006; Peccei and Lee, 2005; Rubery, 1995; Tang, 1992).
First, few studies examine investors' perceptions of gender issues on
corporate boards (Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Lee and James, 2007),
especially in an Asian context. Furthermore, little is known about how
investors react to positions that women directors occupy on corporate
boards. This paper addresses the gap by showing that, while Singapore
investors generally react positively to the appointment of women
directors, they are less receptive when these women directors also
assume the CEO position. A check of the data reveals that the average
abnormal return for ﬁrms that appoint a female CEO director declined
by 1.3% on the announcement date (Lee and James (2007) report a
decline of 2.47% for female CEO appointments in U.S. ﬁrms) compared
with an increase of 1.5% in the AAR for ﬁrms that appoint a non-CEO
female director.
Second, the results of the study support the notion that investors
welcome the appointment ofwomen directors to increase the diversity of
board members, especially when the women maintain or increase the
independence of the corporate board. However, the case for gender
diversity appears more complex, at least in the Singapore context.
Speciﬁcally, the regression analyses in Table 3 suggest that investors are
most positivewhen the appointed women directors are outside directors
(especially when they are independent) followed by non-CEO executive
directors.While this result is consistentwith Kanter's (1977) token status
theory that female CEOs can experience perceptual biases and detri-
mental stereotypes because they are present in fewer numbers and hence
more susceptible to scrutiny and higher performance expectations (Lee
and James, 2007), the results also suggest that the diversity literature
provides a necessary but insufﬁcient source of theoretical support when
examining the link betweenwomen directorships and value creation. For
Fig. 1. Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). Fig. 1 shows the cumulative average
abnormal return (CAAR) for the 45 companies over a 16-day period from day -5 to day 10.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Variablea Mean S.D. 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) 1.2 4.37
2 Non-CEO executive position 0.3 0.45 0.08
3 Outside director position 0.6 0.49 0.04 −0.81
5 Year of appointment 2002 2.37 −0.07 −0.29 0.32
6 Proportion of women directors 0.2 0.09 0.09 0.13 −0.08 0.17
7 Proportion of independent directors 0.5 0.19 0.00 −0.06 0.01 −0.34 −0.24
8 Separate CEO and chair 0.6 0.48 −0.11 −0.14 0.07 −0.03 −0.16 0.02
9 Number of years listed 11 9.33 −0.07 −0.06 0.17 −0.29 −0.07 0.19 −0.12
10 Firm size 5.2 21.06 −0.07 −0.12 0.15 −0.14 −0.22 0.11 −0.28 0.45
11 Firm proﬁtability 2.1 0.89 −0.19 −0.04 0.07 −0.07 −0.19 0.31 −0.23 0.32 0.71
a Correlations greater than 0.27 are signiﬁcant at pb0.05; correlations greater than 0.34 are signiﬁcant at pb0.01; correlations greater than 0.44 are signiﬁcant at pb0.001.
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instance, investors' preference for women directors to assume indepen-
dent board positions over a CEO positionmay be due to the different skill
sets required to discharge both appointments (Daily et al., 1999). Hence,
future research could beneﬁt from incorporating alternative theoretical
perspectives, suchas the resource-basedview(Barney,1997;Grant,1991),
when examining ﬁrm performance and investors' reaction in light of the
various board positions that women directors can occupy.
This study also has practical implications. First, policy makers are
potential beneﬁciaries of the study. The Singapore Code of Corporate
Governance 2005 (the Code) offers guidelines on a range of governance
practices, such as board composition and board leadership structure, for
publicly-listed ﬁrms. Currently, the Code makes no mention of gender
diversity on corporate boards. Policy makers may consider specifying
genderdiversityas one aspect for considerationwhendecidingonboard
composition given that the market generally reacts positively to the
appointment of women directors. Explicit mention of gender diversity
(without the need tomake gender diversitymandatory) is likely to spur
evaluations from a broader pool of candidates and beneﬁt women, who
are under-represented on corporate boards in Singapore. Second, the
results of this study may also interest nominating board committees
who decide on themerits of appointingwomen directors. All else equal,
women directors should be nominated for independent positions if they
are sought after to improve gender diversity on corporate boards since
investors appear to be most receptive of such appointments.
Notwithstanding these contributions, the research methodology
has some limitations. First, the usefulness of the ﬁnancial event study
methodology is dependent on a set of strong assumptions (McWil-
liams and Siegel, 1997). To address this limitation, the possibility of
alternative explanations is reduced by excluding announcements with
confounding events and choosing a short event window. Second, the
study does not distinguish between investors reacting to the perceived
beneﬁts of a gender-diverse corporate board and the symbolic value of
having women directors. However, investors are more likely respond-
ing to the potential beneﬁts from gender diversity since the popular
press largely mentions the beneﬁts from a gender-diverse board.
Finally, this study only captures 53 announcements from 45 ﬁrms,
despite the span of eleven years. The low number of observations
reﬂects the presence of fewwomen directors in Singapore rather than
the outcome of sample selection. Furthermore, the sample of 53
announcements from a population of only 601 SGX ﬁrms compares
favorably with the 86 announcements of female top executive
appointments used by Lee and James (2007) and the 111 announce-
ments of female directorship appointments used by Farrell and Hersch
(2005) from U.S ﬁrms in the 1990s. Nonetheless, the results of this
study are signiﬁcant despite the relatively low statistical power from a
smaller sample size.
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